the utility and credibility of DSM-IV require that it focus on its clinical, research, and educational purposes and be supported by an extensive empirical foundation. Our highest priority has been to provide a helpful guide to clinical practice . . . An additional goal was to facilitate research . . . More than any other nomenclature of mental disorders, DSM-IV is grounded in empirical evidence (p xv-xvi).
In this issue of The Canadian Journal of Psychiatry, the utility of the DSM classificatory system for depressive disorders is considered from polarized positions. Being aware of Robert Goldney's support for the system and his capacity to marshal cogent points, I invited him to put forth the argument for maintaining the current DSM model, while I provide an opposing critique. Goldney argues that the DSM "provides operational definitions of broad depressive syndromes," allows "a comprehensive description of each depressive episode," and has proven to be "influential . . . as an international tool for psychiatric research" (1, p 876) . In my opposing piece (2) , I note intrinsic logical limitations to any strategy that dimensionalizes categories and categorizes dimensional constructs. I suggest that, in practice, DSM categories are poorly defined, its criteria sets are problematic (compromising reliability estimates), and it lacks utility or explanatory power in terms of informing us about causes or treatments. I further suggest that these consequences are hardly surprising when constructs such as major depression are reified without challenge. Such charges proceed beyond being polemical-they are either supported or rejected by evidence. This journal is to be congratulated on initiating such a debate, as it allows the parameters to be defined and challenges us to engage further with such issues.
Goldney is provoked by my writing style on such matters.
While the issues should be debated on their substance, in relation to style, I plead the Ricky Gervais defense: "If you're not offending someone, you're not doing anything." As a colleague once observed, collegiality can be compromising, and every organization should have a prickly bastard who keeps asking questions. The question that I raise is: If the DSM provides a model for the depressive disorders that compromises research and clinical practice, then, and invoking another observation, "what's the use of running if we're on the wrong road?" Certainly, as Goldney argues, the DSM is influential in offering a tool for psychiatric research. Most research reports respect the DSM model and describe depressive samples as meeting DSM criteria for major depression or dysthymia. However, being influential does not necessarily imply or demonstrate utility. Utility must be demonstrated by 2 applications: In essence, does a DSM mood disorder diagnosis inform us about etiology, and does it have treatment implications?
Over the last year, I have put those questions to many expert international psychiatrists, most specifically in regard to DSM-defined major depression. In relation to etiology, most suggested that it is a disease originating from a chemical imbalance and that its clearest biological marker, perturbation, or underlying cause was hypoperfusion of the left prefrontal cortex. However, multiple studies of biological markers in those with major depression show quite variable results: sometimes hyperperfusion is indicated rather than hypoperfusion, while some results implicate the left region and others the right region. In a recent publication, Liotti and colleagues postulated that "medial orbitofrontal cortex function is selectively affected in severe clinical depression [melancholia], but is preserved in milder forms of depression [nonmelancholic] or in transient sadness" (3, p 1836 ).
If we accept for the moment that this last exemplar finding is valid, several points can be made, independent of the simple equating of depressive subtype (that is, melancholic or nonmelancholic) with disorder severity. First, if such an abnormality is a "disease-specific effect or marker" (3) of the melancholic subtype but not of the nonmelancholic subtype, it cannot be an efficient marker of major depression, which is an overall class diagnosis that subsumes both subtypes-unless, and implausibly, every individual with major depression has "melancholic depression." Second, even if medial orbitofrontal cortex dysfunction is the perfect marker of melancholia (in terms of high sensitivity and high specificity), testing such properties when melancholia is subsumed in an overarching category of those with major depression will attenuate or obviate its integral specificity. Thus the pursuit of causes within any heterogeneous category (for example, major depression) will always compromise their identification and quantification. As noted in my paper (2), research pursuing the etiology of major depression has failed to demonstrate and replicate any consistent neurobiological perturbation, and that sterility reflects limitations intrinsic to the concept of major depression.
The second question I put to the experts was, How does a diagnosis of major depression shape your approach to management? In contrast to many treatment guidelines, which are not reluctant to offer firm counsel on the basis of this diagnosis alone, very few experts believed that such a diagnosis alone allowed for any management recommendation. For those who felt it was sufficient, their answers were illuminating. One expert offered the Hobson's choice view that it was not an issue that he considered because he started all depression patients on an antidepressant drug. Another stated that he generally allowed patients to choose and then followed their choice-a "patient-powered" approach that appears to assume that the patient has more knowledge than the expert.
Perhaps the second expert is dispirited by the nonspecific treatment findings in the literature. In my overview (2) , I note that the evidence base for the efficacy of differing antidepressant drugs and psychotherapies comprises psychiatry's largest database-and yet all modalities emerge as equipotent in metaanalyses of treatments for major depression. Such a result allows proponents of each therapy to argue that their preferred treatment is evidence-based and efficacious, but in actuality, this is another sterile consequence of ignoring the limitations imposed by regarding major depression as a meaningful diagnosis. Thus I have difficulty in accepting a judgment that the DSM system has utility in informing us about causes and management.
Goldney (1) suggests that our alternative subtyping model of the principal depressive classes (that is, psychotic, melancholic, and nonmelancholic) is not substantially different from the DSM model. This is correct in substance but disproved in the details. Given that the definition of melancholia has long preoccupied psychiatry, let us focus on this condition. The DSM model positions melancholia as a subtype of major depression, with such a diagnosis accorded to those who, in addition to meeting criteria for major depression, experience anhedonia or a nonreactive mood and 3 or more of 6 other features. Of the latter group, 3 (weight loss, observed psychomotor disturbance, and excessive or inappropriate guilt) are also criteria for major depression. As a consequence of this narrow boundary between major depression and its melancholic subtype, both overdiagnosis and underdiagnosis are risked. As noted in my overview (2) , DSM-defined melancholia also includes problematic concatenated criteria and negative definitions, a scenario that further risks compromising a valid definition of melancholia. In studies conducted by my colleagues and I (4), the DSM decision rules appear (in comparison to other measures of melancholia such as the Newcastle system and our CORE system) to overdiagnose melancholia, a risk integral to any dimensionally based system, where a diagnostic state can be achieved without great difficulty once the base of "major depression" has been reached.
My colleagues and I (4) assert that melancholia, rather than being a dimensionally severe condition, is quintessentially a categorical condition awaiting prototypic definition as a category. Our approach has been to try to identify the specific features that are both necessary and sufficient to the identification of psychotic and melancholic depression.
I would now like to move on to the diagnosis of subsyndromal depression. Logically, if a condition is subclinical or subsyndromal, how can it exist? Further, if a dimensional system is valid, then one might imagine that there would be a set of dose-response components with, say, the impact and impairment associated with major depression being more severe than for those with minor depression and subsyndromal depression. Empirical studies fail to support that model. For example, Judd and colleagues analyzed a community database comprising 102 individuals with major depression and 270 with subsyndromal depressive symptoms. Apart from ratings of health status, "no significant differences were found between subjects with sub-syndromal symptoms and those with major depression" (5, p 1411) on impaired daily functioning and multiple other parameters. Such a result challenges the concept of subclinical depression, as well as the logic and application of a severity-based approach to classification.
Finally, our typology of the nonmelancholic disorders (see 6,7) has proceeded beyond the initial studies referenced by Goldney (1) and has been developed into a more fine-grained model than offered by earlier researchers. Goldney references models that focused more on describing nonmelancholic depression at the class level (for example, neurotic depression and reactive depression) or syndrome level (for example, anxious depression and hostile depression). Our starting point for developing a model was to operationalize an important observation made by Kiloh that neurotic depression is "a diffuse entity encompassing some of the ways in which the patient utilizes his defence mechanisms to cope with his own neuroticism and concurrent environmental stress" (8, p 194) . In essence, we position the nonmelancholic disorders as reflecting an interaction between distal or proximal life event stressors and certain personality styles. In seeking to define disorder patterns and candidate personality constructs, we progressively developed a model (6, 7) that allows any personality contribution to be considered at both the higher-order molar construct and lower-order facet levels.
The risk of the traditional approach that regards neurotic or reactive depression as an overarching class (as was assumed by many who defined and favoured a binary model as opposed to a unitary one) is that, again, "class" status will be ascribed to a heterogeneous set of constituent disorders and conditionsas has occurred for DSM concepts such as major depression and dysthymia. The risk in modelling nonmelancholic disorders (allowing up to 8 personality-weighted factors) is to be too fine-focused in application. We address this risk by suggesting (7) that research endeavors should not be restricted to the 8 constructs (nor any other finite number) but should examine any personality contribution, from its higher-order molar construct through to its lower-order facet manifestation, and determine where explanatory strength lies for differing clinical outcome and research studies.
The DSM system is dimensionally underpinned and nonetiological. Our alternative model seeks to weight the etiological drivers or determinants of disparate conditions effecting differing clinical patterns. It assumes that melancholic and psychotic depression are categorical conditions reflecting perturbed neuropathological processing (with distinct phenotypic markers) and that the nonmelancholic disorders are spectrum disorders primarily reflecting the dimensional expression of stressors and personality styles. Resolving whether our model, the DSM, or any other contrasting model is most likely to "approach the truth" would be best achieved by competitively testing the utility of the models in the field rather than debating their merits, despite this welcome opportunity to overview relative properties in this issue of The Canadian Journal of Psychiatry.
The DSM-IV system has several intrinsic limitations, but because of its reputation, it risks additional interpretive concerns. The DSM definition of major depression is perhaps the best example, which is so simple that it is commonly reified as an entity with explanatory power. Major depression should, in fact, be regarded as it was presented in DSM-III-as an approximate estimate of the probability of an individual having an episode of clinical depression. Just as we proceed in the rest of medicine, there is a need to refine the broad diagnostic domain. We suggest that severity-based approaches have failed to provide an acceptable standard and argue for the necessity of a subtyping approach that captures integral constituent disorders or patterns that have differential causal and (or) treatment paradigm implications. Our approach offers an alternate model that we suggest is worth considering and testing for its utility. 
